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The Nature of Clinical Evidence: Floating 
Currencies Rather than Gold Standards
Contemporary physicists have problems with both the very big and the very small. More precisely, they have difficulty in get-
ting the same (unifying) theory to work both at 
the scale of the elementary particles and at the 
vast scale of the cosmos (Smolin, 2006). Medical 
scientists have problems with scale too, only per-
haps they are a little less ambitious than physicists 
and are happy to soldier on with what is at best a 
bit of a kludge. They have grown inured to the fact 
that they need different sorts of studies to explain 
(for example) how, on the one hand, a cell works, 
and on the other, whether a drug is cost-effective. 
They really no longer expect studies of irradiation 
of keratinocytes grown as monolayers on plastic 
to tell clinicians how often to given patients pho-
totherapy, or whether narrow-band UVB is safer 
than broad-band UVB. The robustness of much 
laboratory science comes at a cost: experimen-
tal power is maximized by the creation of artifi-
cial models in which there is tight experimental 
control over most variables. So, much genuine 
advancement has come from modern molecular 
biology, but, at the same time, the subject hardly 
has any quantification. Experiments are designed 
to discover pathways when all else has been iso-
lated and background variance reduced. This is 
the classical experimental method of biological 
reductionism that has been and will continue to 
be successful.
This dialectic between control and scale is not 
new. Over a century ago, T.H. Huxley, Darwin’s 
defender (“bulldog”), reminded physicists that it 
was not possible to predict Hamlet from a knowl-
edge of the forces acting between the atoms in 
a mutton chop (Ziman, 2003). Each time we 
ascend a level of complexity, the confidence 
limits on what we predict get larger. Sometimes 
we even forget how limited our powers are. 
For instance, we move from phenotype to gene 
because we can rarely just mutate a particular 
gene and predict the phenotype. Going from 
primary sequence to protein folding through to 
myriad physiological pathways defeats us. Just 
compare cancer phenotypes in mouse models 
with the pattern of cancers in humans when the 
same gene is mutated. Contrast the actions of 
retinoids on cultured cells with what they do in 
humans in clinical practice. Or compare mouse 
pharmacology with human pharmacology. These 
problems are not limited to dermatology; of over 
1,000 compounds tested in animal models of 
ischemic stroke, none of the 114 compounds 
that have entered clinical trials has worked 
(Anonymous, 2006).
The last example is germane because it refers 
to the results of randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs). Whereas once, just as in Arrowsmith 
(Lewis, 2002), our scientific hero may have strid-
den straight from laboratory to human, with a 
clear and unequivocal N-of-1 study, we are not 
so persuaded. We demand harder evidence, and 
the gold standard of our day, following the great 
insights of Ronald Fisher and Austin Bradford 
Hill, is said to be the RCT. For many, the RCT is 
the physician’s experimental method, the coun-
terpart of the experiments conducted by wet-
bench scientists in model systems. Only if a ther-
apy passed this “experimental test” would it be 
appropriate to enter clinical practice.
Two recent editorials in the Journal of 
Investigative Dermatology bear on these 
issues. The first, by the Journal’s editor, Lowell 
Goldsmith, discussed conflict of interest 
(Goldsmith, 2006). What has conflict of interest 
got to do with RCTs? Simply that conflict of inter-
est looms large not because it reminds us of how 
common human frailty or deceit is, but because it 
serves to remind us how easily our quest for truth 
is subverted. Conflict of interest is of course not 
confined to RCTs, but the problem appears most 
acute there. Science still hankers after the single 
great experiment that ends all dissent — eppur si 
muove (“and yet it moves”), in Galileo’s memo-
rable words. Finding out that one’s belief may be 
mistaken merely because one trial among many 
was not published is like finding Newtonian 
physics to be wrong just because Newton failed 
to tell us that he once saw an apple fall sideways.
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The second editorial, by Freeman, Williams, and 
Dellavalle (Freeman et al., 2006), was on systematic 
reviews in dermatology. The authors argue that such 
reviews are increasingly important. Lest we are in any 
doubt, the authors, in their conflict-of-interest statement, 
all admit to being enthusiastic participants in the Cochrane 
Collaboration. No surprises there. Yet for all the usual 
warnings about publication bias, inadequate sample sizes, 
and so on, the authors find themselves in a logical bind, as 
I am sure they would be the first to admit. Although they 
can make a case for their viewpoint, by the standards by 
which they judge individual studies, they cannot produce 
any experimental data — let alone produce a synthesis of 
such studies. Whether systematic reviews are more or less 
important has never been subject to experimental study. 
The problem can, therefore, be simply stated. Resolution 
is far harder.
Here it is appropriate to explore what is meant by the 
metaphor of the RCT being the evidential gold stan-
dard. In banking we may choose to peg the dollar or the 
euro against gold. This means that we promise to always 
exchange a fixed number of dollars or euros for a defined 
amount of gold. If we print more dollars, we must there-
fore hold more gold. We might not even believe there is 
anything intrinsically valuable about gold but rather see it 
as a convention that others are historically happy to sup-
port. Now look at the situation with RCTs. First, for RCTs 
to act as a gold standard, we need something to exchange 
them for. This, of course, would be evidence not based on 
clinical trials. This evidence is more abundant than RCT 
evidence, but its providence is less secure. But of course 
the metaphor breaks down at this stage. We have no for-
mal way to equate non-RCT evidence with RCT evidence. 
When people produce guidelines and systematic reviews, 
they have no formal way to convert one form of evidence 
into another — apart from judgment, that is. But, of course, 
judgment is frail, and the purpose of science is to minimize 
its role. Second, we are now used to finding that different 
RCTs give different results and that the results of RCTs differ 
from those of systematic reviews. We are also increasingly 
aware that failure to report studies may lead to error. It is as 
though the central bank had taken to mixing base metals in 
with its gold to make its reserves seem larger. Finally, there 
is no simple relation between methods of acquiring knowl-
edge and the strength of the evidence. Playing Russian rou-
lette with three chambers loaded is more dangerous than 
playing with one chamber loaded, although I have seen 
no RCT reported to that effect. The strength of evidence 
for any belief comes from a mishmash of knowledge at 
different levels that we appear to be unable to formalize. 
Susan Haack, the American philosopher, strikes an insight-
ful metaphor: “the structure of evidence is not linear, like 
a mathematical proof, but ramifies like a crossword puz-
zle” (Haack, 2004; Haack, 2003). When a metaanalysis of 
homeopathy claimed a positive effect, rather than adopt an 
absurd position, most viewed it as a demonstration of how 
noisy and imperfect the techniques of RCTs and metaanaly-
sis are (Vandenbroucke, 1997).
A number of arguments follow from the realization that 
RCTs cannot be the evidential gold standard. For instance, 
Freeman, Williams, and Dellavalle (2006) argue that careful 
systematic reviews will allow a final decision to be made on 
whether a treatment works, and funding need not be wasted 
on further trials. But this is to misunderstand both the nature 
of evidence and elementary statistical theory. All accumula-
tions of evidence can do is make adoption of certain posi-
tions more or less tenable. Even under the Neyman–Pearson 
paradigm of statistical theory, which Freeman and colleagues 
(2006) implicitly seem to follow, all we can say is that we 
may choose to accept error in a certain proportion of cases 
— for example, 5 in 100 (P = 0.05), 1 in 100 (P = 0.01), and 
so on. Such numbers in the context of clinical trials are often 
spuriously precise. When, during the Challenger enquiry, 
Richard Feynman was told that the chance of an error in a 
certain process was 1:105, he retorted, “if a man tells me 
the chance of failure is 1 in 105 I know he is full of crap” 
(Feynman, 2001). He preferred the clinical judgment of the 
engineer to the spurious certainty of a naive statistician.
Where does this leave us? Should we abandon clinical 
trials? Of course not. They remain a potent way of determin-
ing whether interventions work. Should we accumulate tri-
als and look at what a collection of studies says? Of course. 
What RCTs are not, nor systematic reviews, is an eviden-
tial gold standard. Just as we now realize that extrapolation 
from the bench to the clinic is fraught with hazard, so we 
are belatedly waking up to the fact that in the treatment of 
individual patients, all the evidence, from whatever source, 
needs to be considered. Knowing how to treat the patient in 
front of you still resists checklists and formalization. For the 
moment, anyway.
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